United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

ORIGINAL

77-4171

United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit

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BP/S

CAMILLO RIZZUTO,

Petitioner,

against

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

Petition For Review of a Final Order of
The Board of Immigration Appeals

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
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A. DANIEL FUSARO
SECOND CIRCUIT

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DOCKET NO. 77-4171

CAMILLO RIZZUTO,

Petitioner,

-against-

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to deny the Petitioner's application solely in the exercise of discretion, for permission to return to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of more than seven consecutive years, made pursuant to Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, was arbitrary, capricious or constituted an abuse of discretion in view of the Petitioner's long period of continuous residence in this country, his strong family ties here and his firmly established roots in the United States.

2. Whether it was error for the Immigration Judge to refuse to admit into evidence documentary proof of the Petitioner's minor role in the events for which he was convicted, where there was no objection by the Respondent's counsel and where there was absolutely no showing that such proof was unreliable or untrustworthy.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (hereinafter, the "Act"), 8 U.S.C. Section 1105 a(a), the petitioner, Camillo Rizzuto (hereinafter, the "Petitioner"), petitions this Court for review of a final order of deportation entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (hereinafter, the "Board") on August 25, 1977. That decision held that although the Petitioner was statutorily eligible for permission to return to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years pursuant to Section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(c), as interpreted by this Court, his application would be denied purely as a matter of discretion (A1-3; R7-9).[1]

The Petitioner contends that the decision of the Board to decline to exercise discretion favorably is arbitrary, capricious and constitutes an abuse of discretion in that it failed to give proper weight to the Petitioner's demonstrated equities such as his citizen family members, his long period of lawful residence in this country and his firmly established roots here, in contravention of well established criteria governing the favorable exercise of discretion. Furthermore, the Petitioner contends that it was error to refuse to admit into evidence a small portion of the transcript of his criminal conviction wherein the United States prosecutor stated that the Petitioner was only a minor figure in the criminal scheme and especially where the Government's attorney did not object to this offer of proof.

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1. References preceded by the letter "A" refer to pages in the Appendix filed with this brief. References preceded by the letter "R" refer to pages in the certified administrative record filed in this Court on or about December 16, 1977.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Petitioner is an alien, a native and citizen of Italy. He was married to Maria Rizzuto, a United States citizen, on June 7, 1965 (R110), and they have three citizen children, Rose Rizzuto, age 11, Maria Rizzuto, age 10, and John Rizzuto, age 4, all of whom continue to reside here.

The Petitioner had first entered the United States on or about August 29, 1964 and subsequently adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident on November 25, 1965 on the basis of his marriage. He has continued to reside in the United States ever since his arrival.

On April 30, 1974, the Petitioner was convicted after trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, for a drug related offense, to wit, possession with intent to distribute a narcotic substance and for conspiracy to do so (R 102). That conviction was affirmed by this Court on October 9, 1974 (R 101).[2] As a result of this conviction, deportation proceedings were commenced against him by the issuance of an order to show cause charging him with being deportable from the United States under Section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1251(a)(11), as an alien who has been convicted of a violation of law relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs (A34, 35; R 97, 98).

On August 11, 1976, the Petitioner had a deportation hearing at the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connecticut. At the hearing, the Petitioner conceded the factual allegations contained in the order to show cause and admitted that he was subject to deportation on the charge alleged (A9; R64). However, the Petitioner then made an application for relief from deportation. The basis of his request was to seek reinstatement of his permanent residence under Section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section

2. *U.S. v. Rizzuto*, 504 F.2d 419 (2nd Cir. 1974).

1182(c), as interpreted and made applicable to him by this Court in *Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*. 532 F. 2d 268 (2nd Cir. 1976). In support of his request, he also filed the appropriate form entitled "Application for Advance Permission to Return to Unrelinquished Domicile" (A32, 33; R99, 100).

The Immigration Judge then received testimony to establish the Petitioner's statutory entitlement to the relief and to demonstrate that discretion should be favorably exercised. The Petitioner testified to his marriage to a United States citizen and attested to the birth of his three children in this country (A13, 14; R68, 69). He also testified that he had always been employed and able to support his family, having worked primarily as a pressman (A15; R70). The Petitioner readily admitted that since his arrest on the criminal charge, he did experience difficulty in obtaining employment (A17; R72).

Additionally, the Petitioner testified that his mother is a permanent resident of the United States and that he has a brother who is a United States citizen (A18; R73). Finally, he testified as to his limited education and the inability to find work and support his family if he were returned to Italy (A18; R73).

Following the Petitioner's testimony, Mrs. Maria Rizzuto was called and she testified to her deep love and affection for her husband. She also established the close affinity their children have for their father. She further testified that she last worked in 1966 and because of her husband's incarceration, she and her children were forced to receive welfare in order to sustain themselves (A20-25; R75-80).

Immediately following the testimony of Mrs. Rizzuto, the Petitioner called the Reverend Edwin J. Coin, a Catholic priest and prison chaplain. Father Coin testified that the Petitioner was very active in the religious program at the institution. He further asserted that the Petitioner

was a responsible individual, has strong family ties and that he had always conducted himself in a very admirable and gentlemanly way (A25-27; R80-82).

In addition to the oral testimony adduced at the hearing, the Petitioner introduced several documents in support of his application for discretionary relief. The Immigration Judge received into evidence a letter from the Petitioner's Block Association demonstrating his respected reputation in the community, his community participation and his interest in the welfare of his neighbors (R104). Also received in evidence was the Petitioner's Progress Report at Danbury which contained no adverse information and recommended an early parole (R113 and 114).

Most significantly, the Petitioner also sought to introduce into evidence the opening statement of the Assistant United States Attorney who prosecuted him in the criminal case. That statement was deemed significant in that the prosecutor had described the Petitioner as the most minor figure in the criminal scheme. However, even in the absence of any objection by the Respondent's attorney, the Immigration Judge refused to admit any portion of this offer of proof (A27-20; R82-84).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Immigration Judge reserved decision. On September 8, 1976, the Immigration Judge rendered his decision finding the Petitioner deportable and denying his application for discretionary relief (A4-8; R47-51). That decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals on August 25, 1977 (A1-3; R7-9).

This petition for review was then filed in this Court on September 21, 1977, seeking review of the Board's decision.

RELEVANT STATUTE

Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended:

Section 212, 8 U.S.C. Section 1182:

(c) Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of paragraph (1) through (25) and paragraphs (30) and (31) of subsection (a). Nothing contained in this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise the discretion vested in him under section 211(b).

RELEVANT REGULATION

Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.):

Section 242.14 Evidence:

(c) Use of prior statements. The special inquiry officer may receive in evidence any oral or written statement which is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any investigation, examination, hearing or trial.

ARGUMENT

THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED AND THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS SET ASIDE

POINT I

THE DECISION TO DENY THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION SOLELY IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Under our immigration laws, aliens convicted of narcotics offenses are compelled to suffer the drastic consequence of banishment from the United States. Thus, Congress has chosen to exclude from our shores such aliens under Section 212 (a)(23) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(a)(23), and to deport similarly situated aliens who have been residing in the United States pursuant to Section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1251(a)(11). Although in many cases, this may result in undue hardship, Courts for the most part, had consistently not interfered with the power of Congress to regulate and control the admission of aliens. *Kliendienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 92 S. Ct. 2576 (1972); *Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 387 U.S. 118, 87 S. Ct. 1563 (1967); *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S. Ct. 737 (1954).

Until recently, there was absolutely no ameliorative relief available to any deportable alien convicted of an offense relating to narcotics, even marijuana, and deportation was held to be mandated and automatic. *Oliver v. United States Department of Justice, I. & N. Service*, 517 F. 2d 426 (2nd Cir. 1975), *cert denied* 423

U.S. 1056, 96 S.Ct. 789 (1976); *Guan Chow Tok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 538 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1976). However, in *Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 532 F.2d 268 (2nd Cir. 1976), this Court extended the applicability of Section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(c), to deportable aliens. This section by its very terms, had only been applied to permanent resident aliens who had left this country temporarily and who were seeking to return to their unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years but who were subject to a ground of exclusion. Under this section, such aliens could be readmitted to the United States for permanent residence in the exercise of discretion. The Court, in *Francis* made this remedy available to a deportable alien who had never left the United States. In so holding, this Court stated that, "Reason and fairness would suggest that an alien whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and return from time to time." 532 F. 2d at p. 273.

Subsequently, this Court in further expanding the scope of Section 212(c) of the Act, decided an equally significant case. *Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 548 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1977). In that case, the alien had been convicted of a narcotics offense similar to that of the Petitioner herein, and sought relief under Section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(c). There the Court, for reasons not pertinent to the instant action, remanded the case to the agency for consideration of his application for the waiver. In so holding, this Court specifically applied Section 212(c) to deportable aliens convicted of narcotics offenses.

Underlining the Court's rational in both *Francis* and *Lok, supra*, was its recognition of the drastic consequences that deportation entails. Although deportation has been held not to be penal in nature, Courts recognizing its severity, have construed the deportation statutes most

favorably to aliens. In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, "deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile." *Delgadillo v. Carmichael* 332 U.S. 388, 391; 68 S. Ct. 10, 12 (1947). Again, the Court in *Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan*, 333 U.S. 6, 10; 68 S. Ct. 374, 376 (1948), stated with regard to deportation that:

> It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.

So too, this Court has also recognized the drastic consequences of deportation:

> Deportation is not, of course, a penal sanction. But in severity it surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal penalties.

Lennon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 527 F. 2d 187, 193 (2nd Cir. 1975).

Upon examination of the legislative history surrounding Section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(c), we discover that Congress had enacted this provision to prevent hardship to an alien and his family in extenuating circumstances. 1952 *U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News*, 82nd Cong, 2nd Session, p. 1705. Furthermore, in granting the widest latitude to aliens seeking this discretionary waiver, this Court determined that Congress intended to provide the Attorney General with great flexibility and broad discretion so as to permit "worthy aliens to continue their relationships with family members in the United States despite a ground for

exclusion". *Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra,* at p. 272; *Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra,* at p. 39.

It is well settled that the discretionary denial of such applications as in the case at bar are reviewable in this Court for the purpose of determining whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or constituted an abuse of discretion. *Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 375 U.S. 217, 84 S. Ct. 306 (1963); *United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy,* 353 U.S. 72, 77 S. Ct. 618 (1957); *Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966); *Kam Ng v. Pilliod,* 279 F. 2d 207 (7th Cir. 1960), *cert denied,* 365 U.S. 860, 81 S. Ct. 828 (1961); *Rassano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 492 F. 2d 220 (7th Cir. 1974). Furthermore, it is equally well settled that this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. *Khalil v. District Director of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 457 F. 2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1972).

Whether the exercise of discretion is justified or unjustified is a concept that is not easily measurable on a judicial yardstick. However, we are given enlightenment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service itself. In *Matter of Arai,* 13 I & N Dec. 494, 496 (1970) the Board held:

> Where adverse factors are present in a given application, it may be necessary for the applicant to offset these by a showing of unusual or even outstanding equities. Generally, favorable factors such as family ties, hardship, length of residence in the United States, etc., will be considered as countervailing factors meriting favorable exercise of administrative discretion . . .

In the present case, the Petitioner contends that upon a balancing of the strong equities in his favor, as

demonstrated from the record as a whole, and the absence of any derogatory information beyond the single conviction itself, the decision should be reversed and the matter remanded to the Board to grant relief.

In passing upon the Petitioner's application for a Section 212(c) waiver, the Board improperly failed to consider or give proper weight to the substantial equities in his favor. In fact, a single most important factor in evaluating the favorable exercise of discretion is the demonstration of an applicant's substantial roots in the United States. *United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, supra; Jarecha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 417 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1969); *Soo Yuen v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 456 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972); *Santos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 375 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967).

Of paramount importance in evaluating one's roots in the United States, is his demonstration of strong family ties in this country. The Petitioner herein is married to a citizen of the United States (R96) and they have three United States citizen children (A14; R69). In addition, the Petitioner's mother is a lawful permanent resident of this country and his only brother is a citizen (A18; R73). In this regard, the testimony of Father Coin reinforces the Petitioner's close affection with his family and weighs heavily on this issue (A25-27; R80-82). Although the Board mentions the Petitioner's family ties, it summarily discards this issue in view of its preconceived conclusion. We submit therefore, that the Board failed to give appropriate weight to the significance of this factor and failed to fully evaluate the consequence of Petitioner's deportation upon his family and the hardship deportation would cause to them.

Equally significant is the fact of the Petitioner's long period of continuous lawful residence in this country. He has resided here for more than thirteen consecutive years, and has been a permanent resident for more than twelve

years. In fact, had the Petitioner elected to become a citizen as he could have in any of the last nine years, he would not be confronted with deportation.

Another important equity in the Petitioner's favor which was totally ignored by the Board is his community involvement. At the deportation hearing, the Petitioner introduced a letter from the Stanhope Street Association (R 104). This exhibit demonstrated that the Petitioner and his family were active in civic and community affairs. The letter attests to the fact that the Petitioner had often volunteered his own time and services to work on community projects. Once again, this evidence is further supported by the testimony of Father Coin (A26; R81) and the Danbury Progress Report (R113, 114) to the effect that the Petitioner was also active in religious organizations at the institution.

Another significant factor in considering the favorable exercise of discretion is the fact that the Petitioner has always been able to support his family until his arrest on the criminal charge. In spite of the fact that he had only a sixth grade education (A18; R73), he was able to obtain employment as a pressman (A15; R70) and immediately following his release on parole, he again obtained work to provide for his family (R29).

Finally, the Board failed to appreciate or even consider the extreme hardship that would be imposed upon the Petitioner's family were he to be deported and thus the Board also violated the Congressional purpose of the Section 212(c) waiver. The Petitioner is over the age of forty and has been away from Italy for almost his entire adult life. He testified that because of the long period of time he had been away from Italy and because of that country's high unemployment rate, it would be virtually impossible to obtain employment there (A18, 19; R73, 74). As a result, if he were deported, his family would again be compelled to rely upon welfare to sustain themselves.

In opposition to his application, the Respondent's attorney offered absolutely no evidence and indeed chose to remain silent. Without relying upon any other fact, the Immigration Judge and the Board then denied relief in the exercise of discretion solely because of the fact of the Petitioner's conviction—the very conviction that severed his permanent resident status and rendered him susceptible to deportation. We submit that where the very infraction creates the basis for the order of deportation, it should also not be used to provide the sole basis to deny discretionary relief. See: *Giambanco v. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 531 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1976).[3] In the instant case, the Petitioner strayed on one occasion from a law-abiding life from which he had enjoyed a respected reputation in his community. He has never been convicted of any other offense and the record is devoid of any showing of criminal involvement or indeed any other derogatory information.

Thus, the Petitioner submits that the decision of the Board to decline to exercise discretion, failed to properly consider and give proper weight to the strong equities in his favor. Furthermore, the Board's decision is contrary to the obvious purpose of Section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. Section 1182(c), which is "to mitigate the hardship that deportation poses for those with family ties in this country" *Lok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra*, at p. 41.

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3. In *Giambanco, supra*, the alien was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude but the trial judge made a recommendation under Section 241(a)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1251 (a)(4), that the conviction not be used against him for deportation purposes. Thereafter the Immigration Service, relying on the conviction, denied the alien's application to adjust his status in the exercise of discretion. The Service argued that although it was precluded from using the conviction as the basis of deportation, it could use the same conviction as the sole ground to deny discretionary relief. The Court rejected this argument implying that where the alien had served his criminal penalty and was subject to deportation, it would be unjust and a further penalty to use that same conviction as the sole basis to deny discretionary relief (531 F.2d at p. 148, 149).

POINT II

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE TO REFUSE TO ALLOW INTO EVIDENCE A TRANSCRIBED ADMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT

The sole basis contained in the Board's decision upon which it predicated its refusal to grant the discretionary waiver under Section 212(c) of the Act, was because of the Petitioner's conviction for a narcotics offense (A1-3; R7-9). The Board apparently reasoned that in view of the gravity of the offense, it would decline to exercise discretion in his favor. However, in reaching its decision, the Board was effectively precluded from consideration of the Petitioner's actual role in the criminal matter because of the decision of the Immigration Judge to exclude evidence of his actual involvement.

At the deportation hearing, the Petitioner's attorney offered into evidence a portion of the transcript in the criminal case consisting of the opening statement of the Assistant United States Attorney wherein Mr. Rizzuto was characterized only as a *minor figure* in the case. Although there was no objection from the Government attorney representing the Respondent, the Immigration Judge nevertheless, refused to admit it (A27, 28; R82, 83). In view of the Board's ultimate decision and its underlying rationale, the Petitioner contends that it was prejudicial error to reject evidence which unequivocally established a portrait of the Petitioner as a minor figure rather than that as envisioned by the Board.

Initially, we note that under 8 C.F.R. Section 242.14, prior oral statements made by any person during the course of an official hearing or trial are admissible in a deportation hearing.[4] The statement by the Assistant

4. 8 C.F.R. Section 242.14 is set forth in its entirety as a Relevant Regulation at p. 6 hereof.

United States Attorney falls squarely within the context of this regulation. Additionally, the Immigration Judge placed upon the Petitioner the unjustifiable condition that the entire transcript of the criminal case be admitted in evidence (A28; R83). The entire transcript of over one-hundred and seventy pages would have been for the most part, totally irrelevant and burdensome. In any event, it was incumbent upon the Respondent's attorney to offer whatever portions, or indeed the entire transcript, as *its* exhibit and the Petitioner should not have been compelled to adopt the entire criminal record as *his* exhibit.

Notwithstanding the regulation above, under the rules of evidence, this statement also should have been admitted into evidence as an Admission by a Party. Article VIII, Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows:

> (d) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. — A statement is not hearsay if—
>
> * * *
>
> (2) ADMISSION BY PARTY-OPPONENT.— The statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

We contend, therefore, that the statement made by the federal prosecutor, in the course of his official capacity as a representative of the United States, is conclusively binding

upon the Respondent herein and should have been received in evidence. It is also equally clear that the attorney who represents a party in the conduct of a lawsuit, "has *prima facie* authority to make relevant judicial admissions by . . . formal opening statements which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." *McCormick, Evidence,* Section 267, p. 643 (2d Ed. 1970).

Furthermore, since the strict rules of evidence do not apply in a deportation hearing, any evidence which has probative value and is consistent with a fair hearing is admissible, including hearsay evidence. *United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner,* 273 U.S. 103, 47 S. Ct. 302 (1927); *Marlowe v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 457 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1972); *Maroon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,* 364 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1966); *Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure,* Vol. 1, Section 5.10a, p. 5-115, 116.

Thus, in view of the fact that the sole basis upon which the Board denied relief was the apparent serious nature of the crime, evidence which demonstrated the Petitioner's minor role in the scenario of the conspiracy was obviously relevant to enlighten the administrative body in its exercise of discretion. Accordingly, for the reasons enumerated above, the Petitioner submits that the Immigration Judge committed prejudicial error in refusing to admit into evidence the transcript of the Government's opening statement, characterizing the Petitioner as a minor participant in the unlawful events.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Review should be Granted and the Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals set aside.

Respectfully submitted,

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AFFIDAVIT OF PERSONAL SERVICE

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF RICHMOND ss.:

EDWARD BAILEY being duly sworn, deposes and says, that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 286 Richmond Avenue, Staten Island, N.Y. 10302. That on the 23 day of Jan. ,1978 at No. 1 St. Andrews Pl., NYC

deponent servied the within BRIEF

upon Thomas Belote, Esq.

the Appellee herein, by delivering 3 true copy(ies) thereof to him personally. Deponent knew the person so served to be the person mentioned and described in said papers as the Appellee therein.

Sworn to before me this
23 day of Jan., 1978

Edward Bailey

WILLIAM BAILEY
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 43-0132945
Qualified in Richmond County
Commission Expires March 30, 1978